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ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF THE 
PREREVOLUTIONARY IRANIAN ECONOMY 
Robert E. Looney* 
The impact of oil revenues on the Iranian economy during a given time period can be broken down into several independent elements. The 
first is the response of the government to changes in oil revenues from the 
administrative side in identifying and implementing areas for expenditure. 
The second is the production-inducing effect of these expenditures through 
linkage and spread effects. A third aspect concerns the production of 
government oil-derived expenditures as measured by the economy's ability 
or absorptive capacity to utilize them effectively. In Iran's case, because 
economic development was the principal vehicle for converting oil 
resources into a continuing stream of real benefits to the country, the 
estimation of realistic spending levels or the absorptive capacity for oil 
revenues was undoubtedly the most important decision )lndertaken by the 
government. 
It is important to remember the context of the problem. By the 1970s the 
Iranian government to a large extent was controlling both the rate at which 
oil was produced (subject to technical constraints) and the price charged 
for its export. All revenues from the export of oil accrued to the govern-
ment in the form of foreign exchange. Production from the petroleum 
reserves was desirable only to the extent that benefits, either monetary or 
nonmonetary, occurred and were valued by the government. Since the oil 
reserves were fixed, production and pricing decisions by the government 
determined a stream of benefits or revenues over a finite period of time. 
Increased output in the near term implied a decision to forego some oil 
revenues in the future. 
An analysis of Iran's absorptive capacity and the government's role in 
attempting to alter it throws additional light on several important factors 
leading up to the economic crisis that preceded the revolution. 
*Robert E. Looney, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (Monterey, California), has been a faculty member of the University 
of Santa Clara, Monterey Institute of International Studies, and University of California at 
Davis, the latter institution from which he earned a Ph.D. The author was a development 
economist for the Stanford Research Institute, served as economic advisor to the govern-
ments of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and Panama, and was consultant to the International 
Labor Organization and the Jamaican Ministry of Finance. Dr. Looney has published 
numerous articles in professional journals and pas authored more than 10 books, including 
A Development Strategy for Iran through the 1980s (Praeger, 1977), Mexico's Economy 
(Westview Press, 1978), Saudi Arabia's Development Potential (D.C. Heath, 1982), 
Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution (Pergamon, 1982), and Economic Policy Mak-
ing in Mexico (Duke University Press, 1983). 
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Conceptual Issues 
Absorptive capacity has been characterized as an ill-defined concept.I To 
this extent it is like the concept of economic development in that there have 
been a wide range of definitions. It is possible, however, to compose a 
definition that is broad enough to accommodate most of the interpreta-
tions applied to the concept: prior to the revolution, Iran's absorptive 
capacity was the ability of the domestic economy to absorb resources at an 
acceptable rate of return within a given period. 
In applying the concept, therefore, two issues must be addr,essed: (1) the 
nature of resources to be absorbed and (2) what constitutes an acceptable 
rate of return. 
In the first issue, a distinction is often made between investable funds or 
savings and the total financial resources in the economy, between supply of 
financial resources and its translation into physical goods, between foreign 
exchange components and the total financial resources, and so on. 
Ultimately, given such a variety of alternative definitions of financial 
resources, the choice of which one to use for analysis must depend on the 
use for the concept of absorptive capacity selected.2 
For the second issue, absorptive capacity must ultimately be defined3 in 
terms of the magnitude o'f oil revenues that would yield a minimum accep-
table rate of return to the country, i.e., both economic and social returns 
would be included. In Iran's case, there was a finite limit on the total 
magnitude of investment during any period that yielded a positive rate of 
return. This limit was set by the decline in the return on investment and 
reflected the scarcity of projects with high expected rates of return. 
The scarcity of high-return projects during any finite time period was 
due in turn to limitations on the supply of domestic resources to combine 
with the oil revenues, including: (1) the availability of labor with the need-
ed skills; (2) knowledge of available natural resources and technology; (3) 
management and entrepreneurial experience; (4) adequate financial and 
planning institutions to initiate and implement projects; and (5) a reduced 
1 Ragaei El Mallakh and Jacob Atta, The Absorptive Capacity of Kuwait (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1981), p. 1. 
2rbid., p. 2. 
3The classic work is John Adler, Absorptive Capacity: The Concept and Its Deter-
minants (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965). See also Richard Eckaus, "Ab-
sorptive Capcity as a Constraint Due to Maturation Processes," in Development and Plann-
ing, eds. J.N. Bhagwati and R.S. Eckaus (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology Press, 1973), and Taher El Jehaimi, "The Absorptive Capacity of 
Libya: A Constrained Expenditure Approach," The Journal of Energy and Development, 
spring 1976, pp. 326-47. 
IRANIAN ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 321 
level of social or cultural constraints on development. The existence of 
such limitations restricted the Iranian economy's level of absorptive capaci-
ty. 
In this regard it must be stressed that to be useful the concept of absorp-
tive capacity must explicitly take the time element into account. The factors 
hindering improvements in efficient capital utilization do not generally lend 
themselves to quick changes. In Iran's case shortages of skilled manpower 
would have required, for example, that the educational system be exten-
sively reformed. Changing sociocultural attitudes and building new growth-
oriented political institutions was also a necessary element but one that, if 
approached correctly, would have been a protracted process involving prac-
tically every significant aspect of society. Thus, the abandoning of a con-
trolled spending policy in favor of the immediate expenditure of oil 
revenues as they accrued appears to have been a major mistake on the part 
of the government.4 
In more specific terms, during 1974 oil revenues increased to $20 billion 
from just $5 billion a year earlier. As a result, the goverment faced two 
alternatives: either to spend these revenues as they accrued (the one they 
chose) or to pace its spending in line with the economy's ability to effi-
ciently utilize the funds. The latter approach obviously was superior 
because it would have permitted a smooth intertemporal allocation of oil 
resources in step with the needs of the economy. Thus, initial inflationary 
pressures would have been relieved as well as the balance-of-payments dif-
ficulties in later years.5 
Iran's novel condition of an elastic supply of financial resources dictated 
that planners change their perspective. As Vakil noted: 
Indeed these (oil) revenues are on the one hand, like the blood of the economy, 
carrying badly needed investment resources to particular areas for purposes of 
expanding productive capacity; and on the other hand, they are capable of pro-
ducing an excessive liquidity situation, if capital resources become suddenly out 
of line with other complementary factors of production (such as skilled labor, 
technology, organizational skills, natural resources or general infrastructure ser-
vices). This duality renders the planning task all the more difficult under condi-
tions of financial surplus, since it requires a shift of emphasis in the planning 
circles, from an allocation of resources according to the new abundant factor to 
an allocation of resources according to the real scarce factor. 6 
4 Ahmad Shahshahani and Mihssen Kadhim, "Development Problems of an Energy-
Based Economy: Iran," Journal of South Asia and Middle East Studies, February 1979, p. 
70. 
5 Ahmad Shahshahani and Mihssen Kadhim, op. cit., p. 68. 
6Firouz Vakil, "Iran's Basic Macroeconomic Problems: A Twenty-Year Horizon," 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, July 1977, p. 716. 
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It follows that absorptive capacity concepts should have been utilized by 
the government in implementing the nation's development strategy and 
that the best definition of absorptive capacity from a conceptual point of 
view for Iran would have been the maximum level of foreign exchange 
spending by the government that yielded positive returns, given constraints 
on factors prerequisite and complementary to such spending.7 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to make this definition operational because 
the process of evaluating the present value of both monetary and non-
monetary returns from all possible domestic spending opportunities for oil 
revenues over time in Iran would be exceedingly complex, if not impossi-
ble. In view of this fact, it would have been best for the government to 
have chosen an indirect and more macroeconomic approach.' 
In terms of the factors associated with the Iranian revolution, it appears 
that financial resources were neither allocated exclusively to economic pro-
jects nor were they spent efficiently when economic projects were involved. 
The abundance of financial capital in fact contributed to waste and ineffi-
ciency. In this context the best operational definition of absorptive capacity 
is one that explicitly takes into account the productivity of government ex-
penditures in contributing to real nonoil gross domestic product (GDP). 
This approach would allow, from an operational perspective, not only 
the productivity of expenditures to be monitored but also would facilitate 
rational discussions as ·to the possible limits to be placed on real nonoil 
GDP growth, irrespective of productivity trends. 
For instance, the revenues from oil after 1973-1974 temporarily 
transformed Iran into a capital-surplus, skilled-labor-deficient, unskilled-
labor-abundant country with skilled manpower undoubtedly acting as the 
growth inhibiting factor. To alleviate this constraint and expand absorptive 
capacity, the government resorted to importing a large number of foreign 
technicians. The efficiency of such measures ultimately depends on what 
skills were transferred to the Iranian population and at what social cost.B 
Although this problem requires thorough research and analysis, the picture 
that has emerged so far is mixed at best. Reports of friction, discord, and 
distrust as well as some violence between the Iranians and foreign nationals 
have been documented.9 A cursory analysis seems to confirm Griffin's 
7 Christopher Gebelein, "Forecasting Absorptive Capacity for Oil Revenues: Practical 
Techniques for Policy Analysis," in U.S. and World Energy Resources: Prospects and 
Priorities, eds. Ragaei El Mallakh and Carl McGuire (Boulder, Colorado: International 
Research Center for Energy and Economic Development, 1977), p. 107. 
8M.A. Fekrat, "Growth of OPEC-Type Economies: A Preliminary Theoretical 
Inquiry," Economia Internazionale, February 1979, p. 82. 
9"The Shah's Americans: In Iran for Beaucoup Bucks," The Washington Post, May 12, 
1977, p. A-10. Quoted in Farkat, op. cit., p. 82. 
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observationlO that large-scale expatriate participation in an economy is like-
ly to frustrate the growth of an entrepreneurial class, disrupt national cohe-
sion, and delay the appearance of a development ideology. 
The analysis which follows is concerned with estimating the absorptive 
capacity of prerevolutionary Iran as it related to the country's domest~c 
constraints on efficient investment. Emphasizing the impact on domestic 
income has the advantage of avoiding the calculation of separate estimates 
for the trade account; i.e., the approach assumes that if oil revenues were 
insufficient to meet the government's desired level of expenditure, the na-
tion would be able to easily raise the shortfall in the international financial 
markets.11 
The Incremental Capital-Output Ratio 
All things considered, the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) ap-
pears to be the best measure of Iranian absorptive capacity .12 This ap~ 
proach assumes that increases in national output are a fairly stable function 
of increments in real capital stock. The numerator of the ratio comprises 
the value increase in stock of all produced means of production (including 
working capital). The denominator represents the increment in real nonoil 
GDP. Because the precise time lag between initiation of the investment 
process and the eventual increase in output is not known (and in any case 
probably varies from year to year), two formulations of the ICOR were ex-
amined. The first one sets both the numerator and denominator to cover 
the same increment of time - the change in output and investment during 
a given year. The second measure assumes that incremental output is 
related to prior investment, that is, there is a one-year lag between the im-
plementation of the investment decision and the time at which output is 
forthcoming. 
For investment, nonoil GDP ratios are calculated for a number of 
measures of investments in order to derive a number of specific policy con-
clusions. 
lDJ(eith Griffin, Underdevelopment in Spanish America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1969), p. 132. 
11 An approach somewhat similar to that ·developed in Taber El Jehaimi, op. cit. 
12The limitations of the capital-output ratio as a measure of productivity are well known. 
Cf. W.B. Reddaway, The Development of the Indian Economy (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, 1962), pp. 207-08, and especially Willy J. Stevens, Capital Absorptive 
Capacity in Developing Countries (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971). 
. 
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The ICORs examined included: 
ICOR = total investment (t)/ nonoil GDP(t). 
ICORL = total investment (t-1)/ nonoil GDP(t). 
Similarly, 
ICORPM = ICOR for private investment in machinery 
ICORPC = ICOR for private investment in construction 
ICORGM = ICOR for government investment in machinery 
ICORC = ICOR for total (government plus private) investment in con-
struction 
I CORM = ICOR for total investment in machinery 
ICORGC = ICOR for government investment in construction 
ICORPT = ICOR for total private investment (construction plus 
machinery) 
ICORGT = ICOR for total government investment. 
In each case an L at the end of the symbol refers to the previous year's 
investment divided by the increment in this year's nonoil GDP. All 
variables are in real terms .. 
Historically (table 1), the ICORs have been relatively stable (by interna-
tional standards); however, they do show several distinctive patterns. (1) 
Relatively high ICORs were obtained in the early 1960s, undoubtedly a 
reflection of excess capacity resulting from the government's stabilization 
program. (2) In general, ICORs declined until the late 1960s, then began to 
increase, reaching very high values in 1977. (3) In general, these conclu-
sions hold for all of the various ICOR measures. 
While admittedly a very crude measure, one advantage of the capital-
output ratio in t\le present context is that its movements provide some 
substantiation for several hypotheses that would seem to explain fluctua-
tions in private-sector investment in the 1960s. Given the lack of relevant 
data, these hypotheses would be pure conjecture in the absence of 
something like a capital-output ratio. 
Most importantly the incremental capital-output ratio lends itself to 
econometric analysis, thus providing a method whereby the impact of 
government expenditures and the rate of economic growth can be deter-
mined. 
Capital-Output Patterns 
Capital-output patterns suggest a number of possible forces at work dur-
ing this period (1960-1977). Several mechanisms can be outlined that are 
consistent with the observed trends and also in agreement with events tak-
ing place at the time. This discussion is a prelude to and provides the ra-
tionale for the econometric analysis that follows. 
Table 1 
IRAN: CAPITAL-OUTPUT MEASURES 
Year I CO Ra ICORLa ICORPMa ICORPMLa ICORPLa ICORPCLa ICORGMa ICORGMLa ICORLa 
1960 ................... 0.347 0.183 1.15 1.04 1.28 1.02 0.26 0.34 1.40 
1961 ................... 1.656 0.195 3.99 5.69 6.54 6.38 1.81 1.28 5.81 
-1962 ................... 0.408 0.180 0.89 1.04 1.51 1.71 0.28 0.47 1.17 ~ 1963 ................... 0.273 0.159 0.60 0.60 1.05 1.01 0.13 0.19 0.73 
1964 ................... 0.263 0.149 0.67 0.49 1.01 0.86 0.17 0.11 0.84 ~ 1965 ................... 0.230 0.158 0.44 0.45 0.77 0.68 0.26 0.11 0.71 
1966 ................... 0.226 0.189 0.51 0.41 0.76 0.71 0.30 0.24 0.81 > 1967 ................... 0.284 0.184 0.71 0.48 0.70 0.72 0.41 0.29 1.12 ~ 
1968 ................... 0.178 0.210 0.34 0.38 0.45 0.42 0.33 0.22 0.67 
r.t.l 
0 
1969 ................... 0.427 0.225 0.68 0.74 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.70 1.58 ~ 
1970 ................... 0.278 0.230 0.49 . 0.43 0.62 0.63 0.55 0.56 1.03 "ti 
...;_i 
1971 ................... 0.292 0.217 0.59 0.42 0.66 0.53 0.52 0.47 1.11 
-< 1972 .........•......... 0.211 0.229 0.51 0.34 0.49 0.38 0.26 0.30 0.83 t'1'1 
1973 ................... 0.217 0.249 0.50 0.52 0.46 0.44 0.34 0.23 0.84 ("'} 
1974 .................... 0.271 0.249 0.54 0.47 0.55 0.44 0.52 0.32 1.06 > 
"ti 1975 ................... 0.408 0.289 1.27 0.46 0.73 0.47 0.50 0.45 1.78 > 1976 ................... 0.289 0.415 0.69 0.71 0.60 0.41 0.43 0.28 1.13 () 
-1977 ................... 0.687 0.488 1.32 1.56 1.59 1.35 1.06 0.90 2.40 ...;_i 
to<: 
ICORCLa ICORMa ICORMLa ICORGCb ICORPTb ICORPTLb ICORGTb I(X)RGTI,b 
1960 ........................ 1.38 2.62 2.03 0.93 2.43 2.06 1.19 1.35 
1961 ........................ 6.97 10.88 13.01 4.33 10.54 12.08 6.15 5.91 
1962 ........................ 1.52 2.58 2.84 1.08 2.39 2.75 1.36 1.61 
1963 .............•.......... 0.79 2.00 1.73 0.95 1.65 1.60 1.08 0.91 
1964 ........................ 0.60 1.78 1.64 0.77 1.69 1.35 0.94 0.89 w 
1965 ........................ 0.57 1.60 1.20 0.83 1.23 1.13 1.09 0.63 N Vi 
Table 1 
IRAN: CAPITAL-OUTPUT MEASURES (continued) 
Year ICORCLa ICORMa ICROMLa ICORGCb ICORPTb ICORPTLb ICORGTb ICORGILb 
1966 ........................ 0.65 1.45 1.47 0.69 1.26 1.13 0.99 1.00 
1967 ........................ 0.77 1.72 1.37 0.96 1.47 1.20 1.37 0.94 
1968 ........................ 0.62 1.11 0.95 0.67 0.79 0.81 0.99 0.76 
1969 ........................ 1.43 2.6!> 2.39 1.70 1.68 1.69 2.59 2.13 
1970 ........................ 0.99 1.75 1.69 1.13 1.11 1.05 I 1.67 1.62 
1971 ........................ 0.89 1.81 1.50 1.15 1.25 0.95 1.66 1.44 
1972 ........................ 0.64 1.28 1.04 0.80 1.05 0.72 1.05 0.96 
1973 ........................ 0.75 1.34 1.16 0.87 0.96 0.96 1.21 0.95 
1974 ........................ 0.79 1.64 1.26 1.10 1.09 0.90 1.62 1.14 
1975 ........................ 0.91 2.34 1.41 1.57 2.00 0.93 2.08 1.39 
1976 ........................ 0.99 1.77 1.30 1.17 1.30 1.11 1.60 1.16 
1977 ......•................. 2.53 4.47 3.97 2.88 2.91 2.91 3.95 1.37 
Source: Computed from data in Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report (Teheran), various issues. 
a1COR =TINP/ANOXNP; ICORL = TINPL/ANOXNP; ICORPM = PIMP/ANOXND; ICORPML = PIMP/ANOXNP; 
ICORPCP = PICP/ANOXNP; ICORPCL = PICPL/ANOXNP; ICORGM = GIMP/ANOXNP; ICORGML = GIMPL/ANOXNP; 
ICORC = CITP/ANOXNP; ICORCL = CITPL/ANOXNPL; ICORM = MITP/ANOXNP; and ICORML = MITPL/ANOXNP. 
Where TINP = total real investment, TINPL = total real investment in previous period, PIMP = real private investment in machinery 
with A and L versus same with the TINP. PICPL = private investment in construction; GIMP = government investment in machinery, 
and CITP = total investment in construction. 
bICORGC = GICP/ANOXNP; ICORGCL = GICPL/ANOXNP; ICORPT = PITP/ANOXNP; ICORPTL = PITPL/ANOXNP; 
ICORGT = GITP/ANOXNP; ICORGTL = GITPL/ANOXNPL. Where GITLP = total government investment in construction (real); 
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In terms of the revolution, the underlying causes of the rising capital-
output ratio in the mid- to latter 1970s should be the main focus of atten-
tion. Events during this period suggest several causes for the observed 
decline in investment productivity: (1) diminishing returns to investment 
stemming from high rates of growth; (2) infrastructural bottlenecks; (3) the 
presence of easy profits, promoting waste; (4) problems in implementing 
aspects of agrarian reform; and (5) the destructive effects of inflation and 
price control on labor motivation. 
Decreasing Returns to Investment 
The returns on capital decreased in the 1970s apparently because finan-
cial resources were applied in greater quantities during a given time period. 
As noted earlier, this pattern could have resulted from the fact that other 
factor inputs, such as labor, could not increase as rapidly as investment. It 
could also have reflected that, as growth accelerated during the boom 
period, the most productive technologies and investments were undoubted-
ly chosen initially but that inferior technologies (because of their availabili-
ty) and marginal projects weighed more heavily in total investment over 
time. 
It seems safe to postulate, therefore, a negative correlation between the 
productivity of capital (as measured by the capital-output ratio) and the 
rate of gross domestic capital formation; i.e., that investment opportunties 
with high returns are limited during any period of time and that, from a 
certian point onward, further capital formation would be possible only if 
companies and the government were willing to undertake projects with 
lower prospective returns. 
A more formal explantion for the observed patterns of change in the 
various capital-output ratios is that sometime in the late 1960s to early 
1970s increases in the quantity of combined factors of production started 
generating a smaller output increment due to the supply pattern of the fac-
tors themselves.13Most economic entities can be identified as having one or 
more required production factors in relatively fixed supply. From a certain 
level onward, additional output will be possible only if other economic 
resources are combined in ever greater quantities with the scarce factor. 
This generally amounts to a rise in input costs and a tantamount reduction 
in productivity and the rate of return. 
Along somewhat different lines, it is now a well-established fact that the 
investment process involves an important element of learning. The high 
13 A similar approach has b"een proposed by Ragaei El Mallakh and Mihssen Kadim, 
"Absorptive Capacity, Surplus Funds, and Regional Capital Mobility in the Middle East," 
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, April 1974, pp. 310-11. 
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capital-output ratios after .1973 might be attributed at least in part to the 
relatively low rate of prior investment. The relationship between the past 
rate of investment and prospective rates is intricate and complex because a 
higher historical rate not only implies greater familiarity and practice in the 
investment field, but also a larger economic system, which would be able to 
utilize considerably greater amounts of capital. 
Finally, recent theories of economic growth have increasingly emphasiz-
ed that the structure of capital formation is as relevant as its volume.14 
This hints at a 'final causative factor. It may be that the number of indirect-
ly productive investments (infrastructure, educational facilities, residential 
housing, etc.) increased in the 1970s with the overall volume of capital for-
mation. Since this type of investment has a relatively long gestation period, 
an increase in its importance could account for the rise in the overall 
ICOR. Unfortunately, reliable estimates for the indirectly productive in-
vestments as distinguished from directly productive capital formation are 
very difficult to distinguish in the case of Iran and any arbitrary allocation 
would be quite hazardous. 
Clearly, both decreasing and increasing returns are logically possible. Ac-
ceptance of the decreasing returns hypothesis for the 1970s does not imply 
that instances of increasing returns were not also forthcoming. Both 
hypotheses need not necessarily be incompatible.IS 
The possibility of increasing returns may have been the real rationale for 
the government's development strategy. As derived from microeconomic 
analysis, productivity increases can take place because as the market in-
creases, the greater the differentiation and specialization of labor_possible. 
The argument that may have been most convincing to the government was 
Kenneth Arrow's contention that (in general), the faster the rate of growth 
of investment and output, the faster the growth rate of productivity owing 
to the process of learning by doing,16 
To sum up, both the observed patterns of the ICORs in Iran and 
economic theory suggest that at any time there are certain forces working 
to increase the productivity of capital which at other times cause it to fall. 
Based on the available evidence, it is impossible to say that diminishing 
returns was a major contributing factor to the decline in productivity dur-
ing the period. 
14cf. T.Y. Shen, "Technological Diffusion, Substitution and Efficiency," Econometrica, 
March 1973. 
ISA theme developed by N. Kaldor, Strategic Factors in Economic Development (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1967). 
16Kenneth Arrow, "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," Review of 
Economic Studies, June 1962, pp. lSS-73. 
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Bottlenecks 
The problem of infrastructure bottlenecks, such as ports, power, and 
transportation, has been noted at length in the popular press. On a general 
level, shortages in these areas can be thought of as developing simply as a 
result of a sudden increase in demand together with a relatively long period. 
required for the construction of additional facilities. 
Bottlenecks then appear in the production chain so that firms relying on 
inputs such as electric power are forced to operate at less than full capacity 
as overall growth accelerates. This occurred at times after 1973 in Teheran 
because the area's power-generating capacity was not sufficient to supply 
all users simultaneously. The result was a series of scheduled brownouts 
and an average complete loss of power of up to four working hours a day. 
The fairly dramatic drop in productivity probably required more than 
limited supplies of service. A reading of accounts17 at the time indicates 
that the manner in which the government allowed excess demand in these 
areas to develop contributed in large measure to the subsequent reduction 
in productivity.18 
As will be discussed in detail later, the government's response to the in-
flationary pressures that built up after 1973-1974 was a comprehensive 
price-control schedule. 
Difficulties in the power industry are of particular interest since they 
were dramatic demonstrations of the failures of the government's price-
control schemes. Unlike many of the government's other mistakes, power 
failures could not be hidden behind a bureaucratic curtain of silence, and 
hence it is instructive to examine the problems of this sector in some detail. 
The problem of an "empty" economy can be directly attributable to the 
workings of excess demand induced by price controls. In general, when 
price controls are in effect but no attempt is made to force demand and 
supply to balance at a fairly realistic price (as was the case in many in-
stances between 1975-1977), resources will be rapidly drawn out of the in-
dustrial stream into final output and final consumption. The result, as with 
power, will be to threaten the continuity and efficiency of production and 
distribution. 
In fact, by the middle of 1977 an acute countrywide energy shortage was 
the most pressing concern for the government. Power blackouts, power 
failures, and insufficient generating capacity disrupted production 
schedules in industry and business as well as complicated the everyday lives 
of urban workers. 
17cr. Edwin Luck, "Port Congestion," The Financial Times (London), July 28, 1975, p. 
26, and Robert Graham, "Power Shortage Plays Havoc with Industry," The Financial 
Times, July 25, 1977, p. 15. 
18Robert Graham, "State A Barrier to Investment," The Financial Times, July 25, 1977, 
p. 17. 
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. 
The problem was not a new one in Iran, but in the summer of 1977 the 
combination of factors associated with the lack of proper price signals to 
stimulate both public and private investment, together with the low rain-
fall, contractual difficulties, and poor planning, exacerbated the situation. 
One of the most devastating effects of the power shortage was 
documented in a report from the Imperial Commission's Committee on In-
dustry (the commission was a watchdog body responsible directly to the 
Shah). 
According to the commission's findings,19 the country's sole aluminum 
plant, Arak Aluminum, had experienced interruptions in its supply of elec-
tricity 760 times for a total of 33,000 minutes between March 1976 and 
March 1977. The plant (whose main factor input was electricity) had access 
to a maximum 35 megawatts (MW) instead of the promised 115 MW. As a 
result, production had declined by 43 percent during the industrial boom 
year of 1974 - a year when the demand for aluminum was increasing at an 
unprecedented rate. Arak Aluminum not only lost millions but disrupted 
the production schedules of its major buyers. During the same period, the 
report found that power failures were the major cause of a 45 percent 
decline in output at the country's principal machine tools factory, also 
located at Arak. 
The problems at Arak were not isolated instances. Rather, they reflected 
a generalized situation throughout the country, especially where firms had 
believed official assurances that power could always be supplied at low 
rates from the national power grid and therefore did not go ahead with 
construction of their own private •generators. 
It is clear that if power prices had been allowed to increase somewhat 
during the post-1973-1974 period, not only would total demand (much of it 
for nonessential uses) have been much lower, but a number of firms would 
have found it profitable to install their own systems, thus releasing public 
resources for other projects. 
The government blamed most of the nation's power difficulties on the 
failure of foreign firms to complete work on schedule on the 750 MW 
generating plant at Reza Shah Dam in Khuzestan. The project was original-
ly planned to be operational in 1977; however, indications were that it 
might be some time before any elecricity actually would be generated from 
the facility. The government blamed the delay on the American contractors 
and the French turbine suppliers for their alleged failure to carry out their 
obligations. But the story appears much more complex, involving problems 
over the site of the dam, tremendous pressure for quick completion of 
preliminary studies, and, finally, delay in implementation that left the tur-
bines on site for a year before their installation. 
19cited in Robert Graham, "Power Shortage Plays Havoc with Industry." 
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These are the kinds of inevitable problems that appeared everywhere in 
the economy as projects were initiated in a hurried response to, but not in 
anticipation of, scarcities and shortages. In short, though the failure of the 
Reza Shah Dam to come onstream was clearly a contributing factor to 
Iran's power shortages, it was not the real reason. The basic cause was 
largely one of miscalculation of the degree to which industrial and 
domestic electricity consumption was increasing under the revised Fifth 
Five-Year Plan. Even if the Reza Shah project had been fully operational, 
electricity supply would still have fallen short of demand. 
Electricity consumption was rising at a rate of between 18 and 20 percent 
a year. By 1977 official figures placed Iran's power shortfall at 600 MW. 
Foreign specialists connected with the power business, however, believed 
the shortfall was nearer to 1,000 MW, perhaps beyond, given the tremen-
dous expansion of electrification throughout the country as well as growing 
industrialization. 
In addition to the ill-wisdom of importing nuclear technology for electricity 
generation, the Iranian nuclear program was extremely ill-conceived from 
the start. There were serious questions about the risk involved since many 
of the nuclear plants were to be situated in the earthquake-prone western 
area of the country. Costly long-distance power transmission would be 
necessary as local use was minimal. The country was also incurring massive 
nuclear program expenses - several billion dollars alone for West German 
nuclear power plants at Bushehr. _ 
In terms of planning failures, it is possible to criticize the government's 
whole approach to power. About 71 percent of Iran's total energy 
generated in the mid-1970s was derived from petroleum, 18 percent from 
gas, 5 percent from hydroelectricity, and the remainder from coal and non-
commercial sources. The basic strategy evolved in 1974 was that alternative 
sources of energy must be developed to replace both oil and gas (regarded 
as too important to waste), especially as production of oil was expected to 
begin to decline in the mid-1980s. Gas, too, was regarded as more impor-
tant to conserve for use in secondary recovery industrial use (steel, direct 
reduction, and aluminum) and as a feedstock for the petrochemical in-
dustry. This strategy was fashioned despite the fact that in 1976 Iran's pro-
ven reserves were the second largest in the world. 
Many of the issues raised by such considerations were never answered 
convincingly, leading one observer to comment that Iran had no energy 
policy at all but rather a number of contending bureaucracies.20 
Waste 
Rising capital-output ratios also suggest inefficient use of expenditures. 
Although documentation is difficult to obtain, one recent study of Iranian 
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import patterns reveals several startling facts about the extent of 
mismanagement taking place during this period. 
An examination21 of imports from 1972 to 1974 found that over-
payments (in terms of the lowest potential price which could have been 
paid at the time) amounted to $539 million or 37 .8 percent. This sample of 
imports represented about 60 percent of Iran's total imports. For 1973 and 
1974 the overall results are similar but with one interesting difference: 
following the oil price increases, overpayments rose to 49.4 percent in 1973 
and were 46.2 percent in 1974.22 
A number of reasons not related to overpayments have been suggested 
for this loss of exchange earnings. 
1. There may have been variations in unit export prices for an exporter 
due to qualitative differences, price discrimination between purchasers, tar-
riffs, and the overvalued rial that could have led to fake invoices (and thus 
to apparent variations in export unit values). 
2. Imports may not have been purchased by buyers with perfect infor-
mation. In reality, imports were likely to have been contracted for by many 
companies or individuals with fragmentary knowledge of world markets. 
3. Existing trade patterns were in large part determined by historical ties 
and may not have accurately reflected current prices. 
4. Some current trade was based on past contracts and thus sold at 
prices differing from the spot figure. 
5. Contracts were made in many currencies and thus fluctuations in ex-
change rates could have affected the dollar price from one source to 
another. 
6. Quality differences could have been reflected in the price. 
7. Quick delivery may have required a higher price. 
8. A large portion of imports was from multiproduct firms which placed 
restrictions on their importing agents. Major importers in the country con-
tracted to multinational firms were committed to import all the products of 
that firm and therefore could not import a competitive product from a dif-
ferent but low-cost producer. 
9. Differential credit terms or contract or transport costs could con-
tribute to variations in import prices. 
A detailed analysis of each of these factors revealed that none, either 
alone or in various combinations, could come close to accounting for the 
calculated degree of overpayment. 
Overpayments on imports were only one dimension of the economic 
waste that resulted from the oil price. increases of 1973-1974. In addition, 
21H. Askari, J.T. Cummings, and G. Richter, "Efficiency of LDC Trading Patterns: 
The Case of Iran," American Economic Review, May 1979, pp. 191-95. 
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industrialization proceeded with little or no consideration given to com-
parative advantage and domestic factor endowments. The structure of 
tariffs was not based on rational economic factors. The results were fac-
tories without workers, in many instances output produced at about twice 
the world price, and negative value added in several industries. 
Inefficiency in Agriculture 
One of the objectives in the prerevolutionary government's anti-inflation 
program was to eliminate the middleman (because of their excessive pro-
fits) between the farmer and the retailer. Presumably this would mean 
more profits for the farmers. However, in eliminating many of the traders 
and bazaar merchants from the system the authorities did not replace them 
with a viable alternative network. For example, a large number of cold 
storage plants were being established as a key element of the Fifth Five-
Year Plan, but their construction was far behind schedule. Plans were 
made as well for the government to spend around $475 million to construct 
27 silos in urban areas; again, the program was also considerably behind 
schedule as a result of the acute nationwide shortage of cement, in addition 
to the usual bureaucratic delays. In any case, given its other commitments, 
the country's trucking fleet could not come close to handling the scheduled 
2 million ton capacity planned.23 
. As a result of distribution problems of the type outlined above and 
despite the price controls and subsidies, such as on imports at stable prices, 
rice cost the Iranian consumer about twice as much as it did his counter-
part in Western Europe. 
Such were the realities that by 1977 the main complaint seemed to be the 
commonplace nature of shortages in many food items. Numerous com-
plaints were made by distributors that the government's procurement agen-
cy was often late or negligent in meeting orders. 
What was clearly antagonizing the agricultural sector was the low pro-
fitability of investment in farming activities, and it was the government's 
pricing policies that were particularly troublesome for the farming com-
munity. Specifically, the contrast between the price for home goods and 
that for imported commodities was a major source of irritation in rural 
areas. For example, in late 1976 farmers received around 10 rials a 
kilogram for wheat, an amount widely regarded as barely adequate to 
cover the costs of cultivation, let alone provide a reasonable living. At the 
same time the government was paying- 18 rials a kilogram for imported 
wheat. Policies of this type were apparently the source of so much anger 
that they drove tea farmers in some parts of the country to burn their crops 
23"Fanning Lags Behind," The Financial Times, July 25, 1977, p. 19. 
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while forcing a number of poultry farms to close. It became clear that the 
agricultural community could continue to carry its burdens only at the cost 
of lower productivity. Quality began slipping noticeably in the fruit and 
vegetable markets and an increasing number of farmers began to vocally 
criticize what they considered to be outrageous government pricing pro-
grams. 
In part, one of the government's major problems was its haste; the coun-
try's planners were moving too fast for the majority of the farmers who 
were largely illiterate. Many potentially proficient plans failed simply 
because the agricultural ministry lacked the qualified personnel to explain 
them adequately. As a result, some "impact programs had no impact at 
all. ,,24 
Disincentives for Labor 
Under repressed inflation the value of money depends on what is 
available for purchase opportunities. Whether the purchase of substitute 
goods will give the consumer as much satisfaction as the goods made ar-
tificially scarce by price controls becomes the crucial issue. If substitute 
goods do, the marginal utility of money income will be maintained. If they 
do not, then it is simply a matter of time until workers will refuse to accept 
money in exchange for additional effort. 
Clearly, the price controls imposed by the government after-1973-1974 
did increase social investment. However, to assure the success of the 
tremendously expanded public investment it was soon apparent that con-
trols alone were insufficient due to such factors as skilled labor shortages. 
Successful implementation of the government's investment program meant 
a further restraint of consumption by workers, i.e., for increasing amounts 
of savings out of wage income. 
The government's strategy to increase its investment while avoiding infla-
tion therefore depended on: (1) the willingness of individuals to accept 
substitute goods; (2) the presence of a plentiful supply of such goods; and 
(3) the belief that the government's action is the only possible solution and 
that the solution is in the hands of just and capable men. 
The theory was that if money had value and thrift was honored by the 
community, then savings would be viewed with respect by most individuals. 
Labor effort would not be withheld from the market, and producers would 
be able to obtain the necessary labor force and reach their optimum levels 
of output. • 
It is difficult to speculate as to the precise timing but it is clear that by 
1975 Iranian producers were encountering absenteeism. Moreover, there 
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were difficulties in getting labor to shift to geographic areas and industrial 
sectors where it was most urgently needed. 
Inasmuch as under repressed inflation high wages mean little more than 
larger amounts of savings, nonmonetary advantages like living in a large ci-
ty with its many amenities or the chance to work at a position higher on 
the social scale began to assume importance. Under the repressed inflation 
labor was becoming inelastic with respect to money but elastic with respect 
to nonmonetary advantages. 
Where employers tried to impose wage restraint, they frequently found a 
well-organized labor force capable of slowdowns and/or strikes (even 
though illegal) which by and large won further wage increases. Most 
employers recognized that despite these increases workers still had pro-
blems simply in meeting their basic needs. Rentals and land prices had risen 
so rapidly that by 1976 as much as 60 percnt or more of take-home pay 
went for housing. Labor problems also had the effect of frightening poten-
tial investors away from labor-intensive projects. This tended to reduce the 
productivity of capital as capital was substituted for labor. 
In sum, the decline in productivity or the absorptive capacity in the 
mid-1970s was brought on by a number of government expenditure policy 
actions which resulted in: (1) the increasing reluctance of labor to offer ef-
fort in exchange for savings (reducing labor's productivity and increasing 
rigidities in the economy); (2) the declining productivity of investment due 
to skilled labor shortages; (3) the appearance of bottlenecks because of 
capital shortages - skilled government administrators and the like; (4) the 
presence of huge profits that promoted waste; and (5) the continuation of 
the high cost of marginal producers in production (because of tariffs and 
price controls that form an umbrella of protection under which high-cost 
producers can continue to operate). 
Empirical Results 
Based on the previous discussion, a number of macroeconomic variables 
were selected as independent variables to be regressed on the various 
measures of the incremental capital-output ratio .. 
For the increasing economies of scale effect: 
GNOXNP = the growth of real nonoil GDP; 
GNOXNPL = the growth of real nonoil GDP lagged one year; 
GGDPNP = the growth of real domestic product; 
GGDPNPL = the growth of real domestic product lagged one year; 
GNOXNPL2 or GGDPNPL2 = the growth of aggregate income 
measures lagged two years. 
Presumably the greater these rates of growth, the more productive 
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capital would be. It should be noted that a bias occurs in the current period 
figures since the higher the growth of the income variable, the larger the 
denominator (DNOXNP) in the ICOR. This is not a problem, of course, in 
the lagged formulations. 
The government impact is depicted by: 
GENANP = the level of real government expenditures; 
GOP = the growth of real government expenditures; 
GPRA T = the ratio of total real government to total real private expen-
ditures; 
GPRA TL = GPRA T lagged one year. 
Presumably the greater the value of these variables, the more they divert 
scarce labor/management from private sector activities and thus reduce the 
productivity of investment. 
There is no a priori presumption as to the sign these values will take. 
Government investment in economic overhead capital could leduce the 
costs of private production or the government's expenditures could divert 
scarce resources away from the private sector. The net effect could go in 
either direction. 
The diminishing return effect is measured by: 
GTINP = the growth of total real investment; 
GTINPL = the growth of total real investment lagged one year; 
GTINPL2 = the growth of total real investment lagged two years; 
ICORL = the respective incremental capital-output ratio lagged one 
year. 
The expected sign is negative; i.e., the faster investment occurs, the 
greater the chance capital will outpace the suppliers of complementary fac-
tors of production. 
The ICORs selected were: (1) total investment (ICOR); (2) private sector 
investment in machinery (ICORPM); (3) private sector investment in con-
struction (ICORPC); (4) government investment in machinery (ICORGM); 
(5) total (government plus private sector) investment in construction 
(ICORC); and (6) total investment in machinery (ICORM). 
The most complete analysis was made on ICOR (total investment capital-
output ratio) and ICORL (lagged total investment capital-output ratio). 
Only selective analysis was attempted with the other capital-output ratios. 
It should be noted that the results were insensitive to the measure of the 
incremental capital used, hence only those for ICOR are presented here. 
The results for 1959-1977 for ICOR (table 2) indicate that government 
expenditures had a strong negative impact on the productivity of capital, 
that is, no positive economies or cost-reducing linkages were created by 
government expenditures. The negative signs for GNOXNP and GNOX-
NPL must be interpreted as reflecting the output effect ( fl NOXNP) in 
light of the strong positive signs for their lagged values. Thus it is unlikely 
Table 2 
IRAN: DETERMINANTS OF THE INCREMENTAL OUTPUT RATIO, 1959-1973 
(Current period formula) 
Depen-
Equa- dent IndeEendent Variablesa 
tion Variablea GENANP GGDPNP GNOXNPL GOP GNOXNP GPRAT GTINPL Intercept r2 F 
-~ (1) ICOR -0.0006 2.71 z (-0.26) (6.17) 0.007 0.06 
-> (2) ICOR -5.62 3.20 z 
(-0.59) (3.17) 0.037 0.35 > 
. (3) ICOR 0.0005 -6.97 3.25 t:P 
(0.16) (-0.52) 2.58 0.040 0.17 (/) 0 (4) ICOR 5.84 2.12 ~ 
(6.82) (3.12) 0.07 0.67 "'ti >-1 (5) ICOR 0.0006 -1.25 2.92 
-< (-0.24) (-0.33) (3.80) 0.020 0.08 tr.I 
(6) ICOR 12.91 -21.09 3.48 () 
(3.58) (-5.66) (8.99) 0.814 17.49 > 
"'ti (7) ICOR 0.002 8.51 -25.75 3.81 > (1.81) (2.12) (-6.16) (9.84) 0.873 16.05 () 
-(8) ICOR -27.33 4.79 3.44 ~ 
(-7.36) (4.71) (10.76) 0.872 27.14 to<! 
(9) ICOR 6.71 -26.49 3.36 3.31 
(2.08) (-8.42) (3.07) (11.95) 0.921 27.04 
(10) ICOR -30.62 4.81 1.29 3.59 
(-6.37) (4.76) (1.06) (10.33) 0.889 18.77 
(11) ICOR -19.51 1.21 4.30 
(-2.41) (0.52) (7.08) 0.531 4.53 
w 
asee text for classification of symbols. w 
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. 
that economies of scale were present. 
The strong positive value for the ratio of government to private expen-
diture is another indication of the effect of the government's bidding away 
of resources from the productive private sector when the public sector ex-
panded at a relatively rapid pace. 
The positive sign for total investment (GTIMPL) indicates the effect of 
diminishing returns to investment. Of particular interest is the fact that 
when the regressions (table 3) are run for the preoil boom (1959-1973), 
several different patterns emerge. Apparently, preemption of resources by 
the public sector was largely a postoil boom phenomena. Government ex-
penditure (GENANP) was not statistically significant in any of the regres-
sions for 1959-1973. 
Diminishing returns on increased investment do not appear to have been 
present, with the growth in total investment not significant in the 
1959-1973 regressions, in contrast with those for 1959-1977. 
Conclusions 
Whatever merit the government's programs in the post-1973 boom might 
have had, they clearly achieved limited impact due to the declining pro-
ductivity of capital. Analysis of the pre-1973 period, however, .indicates that 
many of these problems might easily have been overlooked or at least 
statistical analysis along the lines used here would not have forewarned the 
authorities of this difficulty. 
This should not be interpreted as condoning the government's strategy so 
much as simply pointing out the problems any government would face in 
an environment characterized by considerable structural change. 
On the other hand, the authorities should have realized that even though 
oil revenues transformed the economy into a capital-surplus position, this 
was only a temporary and transient state. The government received ample 
warning at the time that Iran was not a true capital-surplus economy as 
was Saudi Arabia. Given the transient nature of capital inflow, it follows 
that the country should not have followed a growth strategy based on the 
premise of relatively abundant capital and using capital-intensive techni-
ques to increase the national product. 
It appears, however, that the post-1973 growth strategy was based on the 
premise of capital abundance and therefore economized on labor by in-
creasing the capital-intensive investment projects. The strategy was further 
predicated on the notion that labor, both in quantity and quality, would 
soon catch up so that by the time capital inflows from the oil sector began 
to diminish, the process of capital generation would have become inter-
nalized and the country's growth momentum self-sustaining. Yet there is 
Table 3 
IRAN: DETERMINANTS OF THE INCREMENTAL CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIO, 1959-1977 
Depen-
Equa- dent Inde~endent Variables8 
tion Variablea GENANP GGDPNP GNOXNPL GOP GNOXNP GPRAT GTINPL Intercept r2 F 
-(1) ICOR 0.003 2.17 ~ (8.99) (5.23) 0.357 7.20 
(2) ICOR -21.79 5.01 -> (-4.19) (9.60) 0.575 12.60 z 
(3) ICOR 0.002 -17.84 4.14 > (2.06) (-3.54) (6.56) 0.686 13.10 t:d Cll (4) ICOR 22.30 0.80 0 
(3.24) (l.10) 0.448 10.53 ~ ~ (5) ICOR 0.003 -6.19 3.23 >-1 
(3.04) (-2.19) (5.34) 0.540 7.05 
-< (6) ICOH. 27.39 -19.54 2.29 tt1 
(5.14) (-3.40) (3.28) 0.718 15.30 () 
(7) ICOR 0.004 7.81 -30.37 4.11 > ~ (6.19) (1.90) (-9.11) (9.09) 0.937 54.24 > (8) ICOR -36.06 6.85 3.52 () 
-(-6.37) (6.97) (7.32) 0.821 27.57 ~ 
(9) ICOR 10.55 -5.52 4.91 2.98 ~ 
(1.61) (-32.22) (3.23) (5.28) 0.855 21.67 
(10) ICOR -46.19 6.08 4.77 4.18 
(-7.81) (7.20) (2.71) (9.09) 0.893 30.52 
(11) ICOR -35.76 9.06 5.29 
(-2.73) (2.38) (5.33) 0.387 3.79 
asee text for classification of symbols. w 
w 
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little historical precedent or empirical evidence for accepting the momen-
tum thesis. The economic solution instead would have been to base the 
strategy on long-term scarcities rather than short-term abundancies. In 
short, the government's strategy should have aimed at maximizing the 
long-run return per unit of capitaI.25 
25M.A. Fekrat, op. cit., p. 83. 
